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Abstract
Following a series of flood events, the major flooding of 2007 finally triggered
legislative change through the Flood and Water Management Act of 2010 and
proposed the introduction of Schedule 3 (S3), to provide a stronger regulatory
system for the implementation of sustainable drainage systems (SuDS). How-
ever, S3 has been abandoned in England in favour of implementing SuDS
through a “strengthened” planning system. By taking a broader governance
perspective, this article explores the limited uptake of SuDS through the
strengthened planning system. We argue that the so-called strengthening of
the planning system creates an institutional void: a lack of policy clarity that
occurs when the role of the state is scaled back and other actors take up gover-
nance roles. While institutional voids can create successful outcomes, in the
case of SuDS implementation they have been sub-optimal. We trace the cause
of these outcomes to the unwillingness of the Government to engage in design-
ing policy. This creates a lack of consistency and uniformity, as the implemen-
tation of SuDS becomes a matter of ad hoc negotiations and power relations
between local authorities and developers. We conclude that the current policy
has reduced potential to deliver better outcomes and highlight the options for
increased SuDS uptake going forward.
KEYWORD S
governance and institutions, institutional void, Schedule 3, spatial planning, surface water,
sustainable drainage systems
1 | INTRODUCTION: PLACING
“STRENGTHENED PLANNING
POLICY” FOR SuDS IN CONTEXT
The severe UK summer floods of 2007 triggered a national
review of flood risk management (Pitt, 2008), which led to
proposed new legislative and institutional arrangements in
England and Wales through the introduction of the Flood
and Water Management Act (FWMA) 2010. The most sig-
nificant feature of the 2007 flood events was perceived to
be the high proportion of surface water flooding, and the
2010 Act responded to calls for urgent, broader changes in
the way the country adapted to the likelihood of more fre-
quent and intense periods of heavy rainfall (Pitt, 2008).
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The overall aim of the FWMA 2010 was to simplify and
provide more adequate integration of what was considered
to be a fragmented surface water and flood risk manage-
ment system. Amongst the new arrangements, “Schedule
3” (S3) of the FWMA set out requirements for developers to
consider their impact on sewerage and drainage networks
and to make greater use of sustainable drainage systems
(SuDS). Rather than the traditional practice of drainage
through pipes or concrete structures to sewers, SuDS aim to
mimic natural mechanisms of drainage or movement of
water, soaking up surface water through permeable sur-
faces or draining to a surface water body, for example, using
wetlands, swales, retention ponds, green roofs, and rain gar-
dens. As well as reducing the load on the conventional
drainage system, SuDS are also seen to bring multiple bene-
fits to the urban and rural environment in the form of
improvements in water quality, biodiversity, amenity, air
quality, temperature regulation, carbon sequestration, and
health and well-being (Woods Ballard et al., 2015).
Prior to the shock flood events and the ensuing
FWMA 2010, the planning system and its attendant
development management process had been considered
pivotal in “actively encouraging” the use of SuDS in new
development. SuDS policy measures had been formally
introduced into planning policy in England in 2001
(Department for Transport, Local Government, & the
Regions, 2001). However, a lack of clarity in objectives
and standards in practice, in addition to uncertainty
regarding funding and adoption issues, is thought to have
prevented SuDS implementation becoming the norm
(Ellis & Lundy, 2016). In 2014, the Committee on Climate
Change (Adaptation Sub-Committee) reported low
uptake of SuDS in England in the previous 5 years
(between 2009 and 2014); in their review of 111 planning
applications, they found that “only 12 applications [had]
firm proposals for attenuation ponds/swales and only
15 applications advocating the use of permeable paving
as part of the overall strategy1” (Adaptation Sub-Commit-
tee, 2014, p. iii). The commencement of Schedule 3 of the
2010 Act would have specified additional legislative sup-
port and new institutional arrangements believed neces-
sary to move the approval and adoption of SuDS beyond
“active encouragement” via the planning system. They
were designed to increase the use of SuDS in all new
developments through the publishing of national, statu-
tory standards and the establishment of approval bodies
for SuDS (separate to planning), within upper-tier local
authorities (LAs), who in addition would take on their
maintenance (Ashley, 2014).
Following the UK national elections in 2011, fought
over the period of a severe economic crisis (Tait & Inch,
2016), the FWMA 2010 was inherited in England from
the Labour Government by the incoming Conservative/
Liberal Democrat Coalition Government.2 The intentions
of the FWMA 2010 for SuDS to be regulated were resisted
by the Government with an English localism agenda set
on “decentralising power, freeing citizens from the dead-
weight of the state” (Tait & Inch, 2016, p. 175). This was
seen within the water management industry to be a
response to vigorous lobbying from developers (Ashley,
2014). Following a series of unclear announcements and
consultations from the Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the period of confusion
concluded with a statement in the House of Commons by
the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Gov-
ernment (then Mr Eric Pickles), explaining how the use
of SuDS would be secured by “strengthening existing
planning policy” (Department for Communities and
Local Government, 2014).
The government presents the planning system as pro-
viding a more responsive form of governance, while the
evidence available suggests that the delivery of SuDS
through the planning system to date has delivered sub-
optimal results. A place for SuDS? report, based on The Big
SuDS Survey, discovered that only 40% of all planning
applications submitted in England contained SuDS, with
75% of the respondents to the survey stating that the plan-
ning system does not encourage SuDS sufficiently (Grant,
Chisholm, & Benwell, 2017). The Landscape Institute sur-
vey found that, of all the applications submitted to Lead
Local Flood Authorities (LLFAs), “just 3% of authorities
considered the information received to be adequate”
(Landscape Institute, 2019, p. 15). While research has
already shifted from a previous dominance on the techni-
cal aspects (design or construction) of SuDS (this shift as
first evidenced by White & Howe, 2005) to the challenges
of establishing SuDS provision through land use and
development planning (Ellis, 2013; Ellis & Lundy, 2016;
White & Howe, 2005), this article offers a contribution to
the debate by taking a broader governance perspective.
We look to explore why there has been such limited
uptake of SuDS through the current policy arrangements,
which are focused on SuDS implementation through the
so-called strengthened planning system.
The core argument of our paper is that the “strength-
ening” of the English planning system to deliver SuDS has
led to the creation of an “institutional void”: a lack of clar-
ity in the content and measurements of policy that occurs
when the functions of the state are scaled back, and non-
state actors are taking on governing tasks (Hajer, 2003).
The first section of the paper will introduce the notion of
the institutional void and place it in the context of debates
about governance and policy assessment. In the second
section, “The institutional void in current SuDS policy
implementation,” we will demonstrate how the institu-
tional void thesis applies to SuDS policy. While
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institutional voids can be characterised by positive out-
comes, especially where appropriate regulations and col-
laborative processes are in place, in the case of SuDS
policy we argue that this leads to the sub-optimal out-
comes witnessed to date. In the third section, “Suboptimal
outcomes and ‘non-design’ in the institutional void,” we
argue that the backdrop for these outcomes is constituted
by the unwillingness of the Government to engage in
designing policy, which insists on maintaining the imple-
mentation of SuDS through the current planning system.
This leads to the implementation of SuDS becoming a
matter of power relations between developers and LAs, a
sub-optimal situation where LAs lack the power or capac-
ity to secure SuDS in a consistent manner.
2 | THE INSTITUTIONAL VOID:
AN ALTERNATIVE
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SuDS
POLICY
2.1 | The institutional void thesis
We place the surface water management issues and SuDS
policy in the new modernity of Hajer (2003) and what
he described as changes in the way that our society
is governed, broadly characterised as a shift in regulation
from government to governance. Hajer (2003) had observed
that in the new modernity, solutions for pressing and com-
plex environmental problems are not always found within
the boundaries of traditional institutional arrangements. A
growing societal awareness of the unintended, perverse
consequences of large-scale rationalised planning, and the
perceived limits to centralised, hierarchical regulation, had
led to the state working in flexible arrangements with a
multiplicity of actors to solve policy problems (Hajer, 2003).
These more interactive and deliberative practices were
tasked with the framing of shared problems, to draw on
local knowledge and build up shared knowledge to dis-
cuss possible solutions as well as building greater trust
and credibility in the actors involved (Hajer, 2003). We
can see the pervasiveness of Hajer's observations and
ideas in practice and in the water management litera-
ture. For example, the acknowledgement that decision
making in flood risk management has usually been
implemented through a top-down approach without suf-
ficient involvement of stakeholders. This has been attrib-
uted to blockages and deadlocks in the implementation
of the proposed novel measures (Almoradie, Cortes, &
Jonoski, 2015). Instead, the management of flood risk as
a complex and dynamic problem calls for innovative
ways of engaging with a wide range of local stakeholders
(Maskrey, Priest, & Mount, 2018).
Hajer (2003) specifically referred to experiments in
the applied sphere of collaborative or stakeholder plan-
ning in the United Kingdom (Healey, 1997). In such
experiments, where a wide variety of stakeholders frame
shared problems and discuss possible solutions, the key is
that governmental agencies participate but do not domi-
nate the deliberation. Policymaking here is extended
beyond the sphere of mere rule-creation. It becomes a
matter of defining an agreed-upon package of actions to
be taken by a variety of stakeholders, often supported by
soft law such as covenants or agreements that are per-
haps backed up by regulatory frameworks. Hajer (2003)
argued that the new governance arrangements take place
in what he termed an “institutional void,” because there
are fewer and less explicit rules (i.e., bureaucracy)
according to which decisions would be made. He did
originally question whether these new practices would be
the new carriers of political democracy and believed that
there was no guarantee that these new policy practices
would combine effectiveness with legitimacy, foreseeing
that existing political players could capture these new
political spaces. The informality of the institutional void
was considered important to enable innovative forms of
governing to emerge, but it was also seen to have the
potential to generate problems of internal and external
accountability (Lau, 2013).
2.2 | Three potential sets of outcomes of
policy-making in the “institutional void”
Leong (2017) has summarised earlier studies of policy-
making in the institutional void and categorises three
potential sets of outcomes that can emerge. First, that
policy-making in the institutional void can be highly pro-
ductive. This is the case where deliberative and collabora-
tive forms of governance have been evidenced, whereby
actors have had the ability or willingness to frame shared
problems, develop an understanding of different view-
points, and discuss possible solutions to their particular
“wicked problem” (Hajer, 2003; Leong, 2017). Second
(and notably—predominantly), policy-making in an insti-
tutional void is seen to lead to sub-optimal policy out-
comes (Leong, 2017; Measham et al., 2011). Although
local governments accept a policy issue as important,
they develop ineffectual policies, there is an absence of
clear definitions of institutional roles and responsibilities,
and such uncertainty in policy-making leads to mainte-
nance of the status quo and poor implementation of a
novel policy (Measham et al., 2011). While the majority
of Leong's studies reveal the poor quality of decisions
emanating within the institutional void, a third set of out-
comes has been characterised in more neutral terms as
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contingent upon a series of background conditions and
factors being in place, including appropriate regulation,
norms, or political support (Leong, 2017; Stilgoe, Owen, &
Macnaghten, 2013).
Hajer's (2003) recommendation to policy analysts was
not to deny the new field of experimentation, but instead
to pay careful attention and come to an assessment of the
contribution of these new practices and that the literature
should also address the explicitly normative issues that
come with the introduction of these new practices. In the
next section, we turn our attention to the evidence on the
implementation of sustainable drainage, first setting out
the detail of the strengthened English planning system
against the original intentions of Schedule 3. Our account
is based on a reading and analysis of key government pol-
icy statements, ministerial statements, and policy-related
documents and literature dating from 2008 to 2018.
Policy documents and professionals from “England” have
been selected for the purpose of analysis in this paper,
rather than the “United Kingdom,” due to the complexi-
ties of devolved administrations and different policy
prescriptions in England, Scotland, Northern Ireland,
and Wales. Different government departments and agen-
cies operate, and planning and flood-risk management
policies and strategies are set and implemented indepen-
dently from the national (United Kingdom) level.
Wales was also subject to the FWMA 2010, and has
implemented Schedule 3 arrangements. Our focus in this
paper is on England, to thus investigate whether the
institutional void thesis applies to current English SuDS
policy. To this purpose, we make extensive use of the
data arising from the published written evidence
appended to the 6th Report of the Post-legislative scrutiny:
Flood and Water Management Act 2010 (House of Com-
mons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee,
2017a) and the Government's response to said report
(House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs Committee, 2017b). The written evidence was
submitted by 45 stakeholders (including LAs, water com-
panies, environmental NGOs, Flood Action Groups,
housebuilders, Home Builders Federation, Association of
British Insurers, National Farmers Union, members of
the public, other professional bodies, private and third-
sector organizations) who documented their opinions on
the English planning system's effectiveness to deliver
SuDS, set against the original proposal of Schedule
3 implementation. For the rest of this paper, we quote
the written evidence submissions to the post-legislative
scrutiny by the name of the stakeholder followed by WE,
which stands for written evidence (for example, CIWEM
WE; Somerset County Council WE; National Flood
Forum WE; etc.). The arguments presented in the paper
have also been informed by a secondary analysis of the
data arising from the largest independent survey on SuDS
in the United Kingdom to date, administered by the
Chartered Institution of Water and Environmental Man-
agement (CIWEM) (Grant et al., 2017; Melville-Shreeve
et al., 2018).
3 | INSTITUTIONAL VOID IN THE
CURRENT SuDS POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 | From Schedule 3 to “strengthened”
planning policy
To better assess the nature of current SuDS policy, it is
useful to understand how it differs from the S3 of the
FWMA. The original intentions of S3 were to make the
requirement for SuDS mandatory on new developments,
complying with new mandatory and comprehensive
National Standards on SuDS, which would have set out
how drainage systems should be designed, constructed,
and maintained. A SuDS approval body (SAB), separate to
planning, would have been created in each upper tier (uni-
tary or county) authority with the power and responsibility
to approve (or refuse) SuDS against compliance with the
new national mandatory standards. SABs would also have
been required to adopt and maintain the systems con-
structed in compliance with the national standards. How-
ever, after a series of delays and two major public
consultations between 2012 and 2014 (Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2012; Department
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Department
for Communities and Local Government, 2014a, 2014b), it
was announced that SuDS would be secured by strength-
ening existing planning policy (Department for Communi-
ties and Local Government, 2014).
In England, the National Planning Policy Framework
(NPPF) from 2012 has set out the Government's policy on
how Local Planning Authorities should approach plan-
ning decisions on proposed development (Department
for Communities and Local Government, 2012). In
strengthening planning policy, the Government's expec-
tation was for local planning policies and decisions on
planning applications relating to major development
(10 dwellings or more; or equivalent non-residential or
mixed development) to ensure that SuDs for the manage-
ment of run-off were put in place, unless demonstrated to
be inappropriate (Department for Communities and
Local Government, 2014). The existing requirement in
NPPF 2012 that all new developments in areas at risk of
flooding should give priority to the use of SuDs also con-
tinued to apply. The NPPF and associated planning prac-
tice guidance (Flood Risk and Coastal Change) published
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in March 20143 state that priority should be given to the
use of SuDS and a hierarchy of acceptable discharge solu-
tions established—SuDS as preferred and connection to
the sewer is the least preferred (albeit still permissible)
(Department for Communities and Local Government,
2012, 2014). The management of run-off has been intro-
duced as a material consideration, meaning it is substan-
tial matter that will need to be taken into account
when determining an application (Department for Envi-
ronment, Food and Rural Affairs and Department for
Communities and Local Government, 2014b). Generic
non-statutory technical standards for SuDS were publi-
shed by DEFRA in March 2015 (Department for Environ-
ment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2015), covering flow
controls (peak and volume) and a brief detail on the
design and maintenance of SuDS (Ellis & Lundy, 2016).
Although water quality was covered in an earlier draft
version, it is not considered in the final standards (2016).
The details of the two sets of arrangements for SuDS,
initial proposals for Schedule 3 and the strengthened
planning system, are outlined in Table 1 below.
The comparison of the original intentions of the S3 and
planning policy highlights two very different approaches to
implementing SuDS. S3 was designed to be a highly regula-
tory policy that would have ensured SuDS on all new
development, potentially at the cost of increased bureau-
cracy. Planning policy can be characterised as a more flexi-
ble form of governance, backed by light regulation, making
use of already existing arrangements and which benefits
from wider stakeholder involvement. However, we argue
that strengthened planning policy can be more accurately
characterised as an institutional void, as we will show in
the following section.
3.2 | Multiplication of non-state actors
and the diminishing role of the state
One of the more visible differences between planning
policy and S3 relates to the multiplication of non-state
actors, who are now taking up governance roles. When it
comes to maintenance of SuDS, for example, the SAB
would have been required to ensure the maintenance of
SuDS adopted in accordance to national statutory stan-
dards. Planning policy states that planning conditions
can be used by Local Planning Authorities to ensure that
developers have firm plans for the maintenance of SuDS
(Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
and Department for Communities and Local Govern-
ment, 2014b). In the first public consultation, it was pro-
posed that it is best left “open to the developer to
maintain the SuDs themselves or […] a third party [such
as maintenance company, the LA, local residents or
another undertaker]” (Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs and Department for Communities
and Local Government, 2014a, p. 11). This was reiterated
by the Government in the second consultation, which
regards the arrangement along democratic and participa-
tory lines, as it encourages the participation of all inter-
ested parties in flood-risk management (Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Department
for Communities and Local Government, 2014b). The
existing planning mechanism suggests, at least in theory,
that an agreement must be reached by the Local Planning
Authorities and the developer, which stipulates which
actor will take up the task of maintenance.
However, the introduction of non-state actors to take
responsibility for maintaining SuDS is problematic
because, in practice, the maintenance of SuDS represents
the greatest barrier to SuDS adoption (Grant et al., 2017).
All submissions to the 6th Report of the Post-legislative
scrutiny of FWMA (House of Commons Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2017a) have identi-
fied maintenance as an on-going major problem. Man-
agement companies are seen to be unreliable and
inconsistent in the process of maintaining SuDS; “man-
agement companies have been found to be unresponsive
when issues arise, and have a tendency to ‘disappear,’
TABLE 1 Direct comparison of proposed SuDS delivery
arrangements, England, United Kingdom
Flood and Water
Management Act 2010
Schedule 3 arrangements
Strengthened planning
policy arrangements
SuDS mandatory on new
development
Local planning policy to give
priority to and ensure SuDS
put in place, unless
demonstrated to be
inappropriate
SuDS to comply with
national mandatory
standards
Non-statutory SuDS technical
standards published by
DEFRA
SAB with power and
responsibility to approve
SuDS against statutory
standards
Management of surface water a
material consideration to be
taken account of when
determining a planning
application. Planning
conditions and obligations as
the tool to secure SuDS
SABs to adopt and maintain
in compliance with
national standards
Applicants to ensure minimum
operational standards, have
appropriate maintenance in
place, and, where possible,
provide multiple benefits
Abbreviations: DEFRA, Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs; SAB, SuDS approval body; SuDS, sustainable drainage systems.
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a phenomenon that leads to ‘orphan SuDS,’ which fall
into disrepair” (Grant et al., 2017, p. 25). LAs have
responded to the issue by requesting details of the man-
agement company at the planning stage to enable steps
to take enforcement action, but “management companies
can transfer sites on or change ownership” (Wildlife
Trusts WE). Questions have been raised regarding longer
term maintenance; “there are significant concerns that
management companies will declare themselves bank-
rupt and that they will lack the funds to replace assets in
25 or 30 years’ time” (National Flood Forum WE). The
lack of clear and consistent arrangements for mainte-
nance has also been argued to have a negative impact on
the fundamental choice and design of SuDS; “develop-
ments are often built to the option that is easiest to main-
tain, not necessarily taking into account the widest
benefits (as not all of these can be monetarised into profit
for the developer)” (Grant et al., 2017, p. 25).
In parallel with the introduction of non-state actors in
governing SuDS, there has been a gradual diminishing of
the role of the state (we refer here primarily to local gov-
ernment and its functions). In theory, planners, along with
other experts in the LA (such as drainage engineers or
landscape architects), become central figures in the imple-
mentation of SuDS. This seems to indicate that the role of
local government has not diminished but remained rele-
vant and prominent. However, the evidence so far suggests
that the reality is different; “the weakness of current plan-
ning requirements is exacerbated by a lack of resourcing
and guidance for local planning authorities, which rarely
have the wherewithal to assess the merits of an application
in any detail or argue a case with a major developer”
(Grant et al., 2017, p. 24). A reading of the written evi-
dence to the 6th Report of the Post-legislative Scrutiny of
FWMA reinforces this finding: 83% of respondents that
answered the SuDS-related questions flag up the lack of
skill and resources in Las, and 75% of survey respondents
to The Big SUDS Survey stated that planning authorities do
not have adequate expertise to consider the merits of pro-
posals and opt-out applications (Grant et al., 2017).
Pre-application discussions are considered to be of
key importance for quality SuDS delivery, in which the
developer and the LA can identify and negotiate the early
design and adoption issues before the planning applica-
tion is formally submitted and encourage a discussion
with other statutory consultees. In practice, evidence sug-
gests that pre-application engagement is often limited
(Somerset County Council WE), with any pre-application
advice that is offered varying in standard considerably at
a national level (Grant et al., 2017). Furthermore, it is
possible for outline planning permission to be granted in
the absence of a final housing layout or SuDS design as
part of the development management process (Ellis &
Lundy, 2016). If the housing detailed design becomes a
“reserved matter,” the implication is that the SuDS
design cannot be considered at the vital early stage and
planning conditions are thus attached to the planning
consent in the absence of sufficient information. Detailed
designs can return as part of reserved matters applica-
tions, with a new drainage strategy that differs from the
original, either downgrading the quality or eliminating
SuDS entirely from the final development (Somerset
County Council WE).
The written evidence submissions highlight a further
series of consequences that derive from the lack of skill and
resources in local government. LAs are perceived to act to a
minimum standard (National Flood Forum WE) and are
deemed unable to suitably assess the effectiveness of SuDS
at the planning application phase (Wildlife Trusts WE),
which also results in delays in the approval of applications
(Home Builders Federation WE). There is also seen to be a
source of ambiguity when it comes to establishing whether
SuDS once constructed are maintained properly. Seventy-
five percent of participants in The Big SuDS survey
“believed the local planning authorities did not have the
expertise (or capacity and skills) necessary to check and
advise on quality SuDS deployment” (Melville-Shreeve
et al., 2018, p. 14). LAs are seen to suffer from a lack of
resources to monitor the construction of SuDS and their
lifetime performance, reliant upon “generic” building
inspectors to “sign off” developments, rather than spe-
cialised SuDS engineers (Cornwall Community Flood
ForumWE). The lack of capacity also undermines the plan-
ners' capacity to enforce planning conditions (National
Flood Forum WE), typically only brought into effect by a
public complaint or in the event of a large flood over-
whelming a drainage system and/or causing properties to
flood (Southampton City Council WE; Somerset County
Council WE). The Government was aware of skills short-
ages and lack of human resources as far back as 2014, when
it proposed to address them through a “capacity-building
programme” (Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs and Department for Communities and Local
Government, 2014a, p. 1), which was reiterated within the
Secretary of State's statement in the House of Commons
(Department for Communities and Local Government,
2014). Current evidence suggests that such a programme
either has not been implemented or has been unsuccessful.
3.3 | Lack of clarity over norms, rules,
and policy measures
As documented above, the multiplication of actors and
the diminishing capacity of the state can lead to unde-
sired and precarious situations where the maintenance or
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construction of SuDS proves inadequate. This, however,
appears to be a symptom of the larger issue constituted
by the lack of clarity over the norms, rules, and measures
of policy. Several submissions to the 6th Report of the
Post-legislative Scrutiny of the FWMA (House of Com-
mons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee,
2017a) draw attention to the ambiguity in both the lan-
guage used in the Ministerial Statement (Department for
Communities and Local Government, 2014) and the sub-
sequent planning guidance regarding the specific details
of SuDS policy implementation. For example, the Minis-
terial Statement argues that SuDS “should be designed to
ensure that the maintenance and operation requirements
are economically proportionate” (Department for Com-
munities and Local Government, 2014). However, eco-
nomic proportionality is a poorly defined policy principle
that works in favour of the developers at the expense of
LAs, whereby “the definition of cost is drawn extremely
narrowly, relating only to the costs incurred by the devel-
oper, with no reference to direct costs or opportunity
costs for other parties, or the relative benefits (financial
and otherwise) of SuDS options compared with conven-
tional drainage” (Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust WE). The
Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust submission further stresses
that the planning guidance to the NPPF (Department for
Communities and Local Government, 2012) provides cost
(of design, maintenance, operation, and land taken by an
SuDS feature) as a ground on which developers can argue
against SuDS. Developers do not need to provide evi-
dence to support their viability claims or submit informa-
tion regarding the cost of the conventional drainage used
for purposes of comparison with SuDS. This suggests that
the language used in planning policy is non-committal
and presents a series of caveats, which act as loopholes in
practice, allowing room for negotiation for the parties
that lack the incentive to implement SuDS.
The issue of lack of clarity or ineffectual policy can also
be identified in practice in negotiations between LAs and
developers over the very nature of an SuDS feature;
“suggesting SuDS are a conventional drainage system with
a store at the bottom end in the form of a tank or basin […]
is not within the SuDS principles” (Sheffield City Council
WE). The Environmental Industries Commission alleges
that “DEFRA has published ‘non-statutory’ standards for
SuDS that were concluded ‘in discussion with the water
sector and house builders’ and that ‘the final technical stan-
dards were relatively rudimentary compared to what was
originally a more comprehensive draft’” (Environmental
Industries Commission WE). DEFRA (2015) standards refer
exclusively to flow control and flood-risk management, the
guidance lacking discussion of other important characteris-
tics of SuDS, notably to improve biodiversity or water qual-
ity. This thus establishes the backdrop for a back and forth
between LAs and developers in negotiating what consti-
tutes SuDS. It is suggested that LLFAs bow to the lower
quality solutions of the developers, as they cannot argue the
case for a “better version” of SuDS (Sheffield City Council
WE). The Home Builders Federation's submission states
that developers regard higher SuDS standards as excessive,
and as “there is no authoritative definition of SuDS […]
each local planning authority and/or LLFA has the ability
to define and apply its own interpretation of SuDS and not
necessarily one that is consistent with the non-statutory
national standards” (Home Builders Federation WE).
As the submission from Anglian Water states: “there
currently remains a void in both the delivery and adop-
tion of SuDS, and significant ambiguity within the plan-
ning system that is unhelpful for LAs, water companies
and developers, which reduces the incentive to include
such schemes in new developments” (Anglian Water
WE). This section has argued that SuDS policy can be
characterised as taking place in an institutional void. This
means that there is a dual dynamic at play: as the func-
tions of the state diminish, other actors are taking up
governing tasks (such as developers and management
companies), introducing a lack of clarity when it comes
to the rules, norms, and measurements of policy. For
example, this was seen in the non-committal language of
the legislation, which creates room for developers to
advance their own interpretations, standards, or mea-
surements in negotiations with LAs (e.g., opt-outs on cost
considerations, what constitutes a SuDS feature). It
should be stressed that, echoing Hajer (2003), we are not
suggesting that policy-making in the institutional void is
negative or detrimental per se, or that non-state actors do
not have a place in governance. However, we are arguing
that the success of the policy needs to be assessed in rela-
tion to the policy outcomes it produces. The evidence so
far for SuDS policy is that these outcomes are sub-
optimal and that it is not implemented in the best way
possible to higher quality standards. In the next section,
we will suggest an explanation for these outcomes and
identify the current trends in SuDS policy.
4 | SUB-OPTIMAL OUTCOMES
AND “NON-DESIGN” IN THE
INSTITUTIONAL VOID
The written evidence submissions, as analysed above,
echo many of the findings presented in A place for SuDS?
report (Grant et al., 2017) and further document the lim-
ited confidence in the industry that SuDS are being incor-
porated effectively into new developments under current
planning policies. The institutional arrangements are
thus considered inadequate for securing flood protection
VILCAN AND POTTER 7 of 11
and wider environmental gains. The only notable differ-
ences in opinion are documented by the Home Builders
Federation, who consider the planning system the most
effective mechanism for SuDS delivery, and National
Farmers Union, who propose better use of the current
institutional arrangements rather than changes. In this
section, we will provide an explanation for the sub-
optimal outcomes and seek to identify the current trends
in SuDS policy. We will employ a documentary analysis
of the 6th Report of the Post-legislative scrutiny of the
FWMA 2010, namely the report of the House of Com-
mons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs committee
analysing the written evidence submissions (House of
Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Com-
mittee, 2017a) and the Government's response to the
findings of the report (House of Commons Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2017b), as we argue
that this is where the current trends can be identified
clearly.
The overarching conclusion from the EFRA final
report was that the committee was “not persuaded that it
is currently essential to commence Schedule 3 of the Act
in order to improve the SuDS regulatory framework […]
rather, we recommend that the Government strengthens
planning approaches” (House of Commons Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2017a, p. 1). The
EFRA report did suggest that “if policies fail to provide as
robust a regime as that under the FWMA by the end of
2018, we consider it would be appropriate for that Com-
mittee to consider recommending commencement of
Schedule 3 measures” (House of Commons Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs Committee, 2017a, p. 4). The Gov-
ernment's response concurs, re-stating that there is enough
clarity through NPPF and planning guidance to obtain
both flood protection and environmental outcomes associ-
ated with the use of SuDS. The Committee's report did
however raise the concerns from stakeholders that the lack
of clarity over maintenance persists as one of the biggest
barriers to SuDS implementation, requesting that the Gov-
ernment clarify a more efficient way to secure long-term
maintenance and also that “the Government should
enshrine standards for the design of SuDS in statute”
(House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Committee, 2017a, p. 2). The Government in response
stated that “the local planning authority should be satis-
fied that there are clear arrangements in place for ongoing
maintenance” and that “this approach provides flexibility
for developers and local planning authorities to identify
and agree the most appropriate arrangements” (House of
Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Commit-
tee, 2017b, p. 2). The request for statutory standards was
rejected, the Government claiming that “statutory design
standards would not increase uptake of SuDS and would
risk stifling innovation” and that “seeking legislative
change to make statutory standards for SuDS does not
offer clear benefits over current arrangements” (House of
Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Commit-
tee, 2017b, p. 2).
The analysis above shows that there is a discrepancy
between the views of the stakeholders that submitted evi-
dence, which signal major issues with the “strengthened”
planning policy, and the Government, which has rejected
all of the recommendations, insisting that the current
policy provides appropriate tools for SuDS implementa-
tion. Instead, in July 2018, the Government published a
revised NPPF (Department for Communities and Local
Government, 2018), seeking to introduce further clarifi-
cations regarding SuDS. The NPPF now states that devel-
opment in areas of flooding can be allowed only where it
incorporates SuDs (para 163) and that major develop-
ment should incorporate SuDS (para 165). Both recom-
mendations are again followed by a qualification that this
is the case “unless there is clear evidence that this would
be inappropriate” (Department for Communities and
Local Government, 2018, p. 47). Furthermore, it is rec-
ommended that applicants need to take into account
advice from LLFAs, ensure minimum operational stan-
dards, have appropriate maintenance agreements in
place, and, “where possible,” provide multiple benefits
(Department for Communities and Local Government,
2018, para 65, p. 47). The revised NPPF is characterised
by the same ambiguous, non-committal language as
NPPF 2012. As we have seen above, this is likely to repli-
cate the same loopholes that are currently manifested in
SuDS policy practice.
We have insisted on the interplay between the EFRA
report, the response of the Government, and the written
evidence from stakeholders because they allow us to gauge
the state of SuDS policy and its direction of travel, which
sees the Government set on maintaining a discretionary
approach that has, at least to date, delivered sub-optimal
outcomes. Leong (2017) suggests that sub-optimal out-
comes in the institutional void occur at the intersection of
a Government's low intention to design policy and its
inability to change the status quo. We see that there is not
only a low desire to design policy but also an unwilling-
ness to change the status quo. The Government has
responded negatively to all the recommendations of the
report, in effect keeping the status quo intact. We argue
that SuDS policy takes place in a “static non-design space”
(Howlett & Mukherjee, 2014; Leong, 2017). Here, the Gov-
ernment only retains a steering role, through strategic
selectivity (Jessop, 1990). It decides which actors and insti-
tutional configurations are to be favoured in terms of
power and resource allocation (Galland, 2012), but it does
not undertake any policy design. This does not mean that
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it is not possible to implement SuDS through the
“strengthened” planning system. The suggestion we are
making is that this implementation will likely remain
inconsistent and non-uniform. This is most evident when
compared with S3, which would, at least in theory, guar-
antee that all applications that were approved would have
SuDS features. The institutional and practical effects of the
policy are that it provides neither stick nor carrot. Devel-
opers are missing an incentive to implement SuDS, as the
legislation offers them a series of loopholes they can use to
opt out. LAs are missing the legislative backing and the
resources to impose a consistent hard line or/and offer
valuable incentives to the developers to implement SuDS.
Given this backdrop, we infer that SuDS in new develop-
ments are likely to become a matter of ad hoc negotiations
and power relations between developers and LAs. This is
an institutional configuration that exists de facto: a by-
product of the lack of policy design. Where the institu-
tional void occurs and particularly where norms are
unclear, Leong (2017) suggests we will find a policy space
that is “filled with the sort of policies postulated (poorly
informed)” (p. 579). Earlier academic criticism of the new
governance has already focused on Hajer's (2003) identifi-
cation of the institutional void and a resultant democratic
deficit (Lau, 2013). Although collaborative forms of gover-
nance involve a diverse range of stakeholders, this may
not necessarily correct the biases of powerful players, espe-
cially if existing power relations are constructed as a legiti-
mate part of the governance process (Lau, 2013).
5 | CONCLUSIONS
The CIWEM report, A place for SuDS, concludes by stat-
ing that “the Government chose not to commence Sched-
ule 3 of the Act [FWMA] to avoid what it perceived to be
a surfeit of bureaucracy; unfortunately, this has created a
void of effective policy” (Grant et al., 2017, p. 30). In this
paper, aided by the relevant academic literature, we have
sought to analyse the broader governance dynamics
(political, legislative, and institutional) around SuDS pol-
icy and implementation in England. We have argued that
the Government appears to be unwilling to engage in
designing regulatory policy, insisting on maintaining the
implementation of SuDS through the current planning
system, which is characterised by an institutional void. In
practice, there are few to no incentives available for
implementing SuDS, which then become a matter of
power relations between developers and LAs. Combined
with a shortage of financial resources, skill, and institu-
tional capacity, LAs find themselves unable to secure the
SuDS in new developments in a consistent manner
(Grant et al., 2017; Melville-Shreeve et al., 2018). This
helps explain the occurrence of sub-optimal outcomes in
current SuDS policy implementation.
Overall, our conclusion is that the Government has
not strengthened planning policy enough to secure opti-
mal SuDS outcomes and that is favouring status quo. In
response to these challenges, other academic commentar-
ies suggest an approach that favours amendments to the
current policy (Grant et al., 2017; Melville-Shreeve et al.,
2018). Ellis and Lundy (2016) suggest that if SuDS are to
become the norm, there needs to be “clarity of objectives,
standards and practice as well as certainty regarding
funding and related adoption issues” (p. 635). CIWEM's
report, A Place for SuDS? calls for repealing the automatic
right to connect to conventional drainage systems, push-
ing for comprehensive statutory standards, and clarifying
the issue of adopting SuDS (Grant et al., 2017). While
these are steps in the right direction, the issue of the lack
of capacity at the level of LAs, combined with the incon-
sistency of the planning arrangements in England and the
Government's preference for status quo, is still likely to
undermine the uniformity and quality of SuDS outcomes.
The adoption of S3 in Wales, which has come into
effect in January 2019, provides our future research a win-
dow into the potential for a more integrated regulatory
framework. Further comparative research will be required
to analyse the progress of a regulatory style of SuDS
policy implementation as, for example, by the Welsh Gov-
ernment in the coming years, against SuDS policy in
England.
The persistence of the current system for delivering
SuDS engenders negative consequences for the flood-risk
management in England. The increase in the occurrence of
flash and pluvial floods brings with it an increase in uncer-
tainty, especially when considering that they can affect
areas with no apparent history of flooding (Penning-
Rowsell & Korndewal, 2018). Surface-located, high-quality
SuDS are an appropriate solution for tackling these kinds
of flood events while providing a host of other important
benefits. However, we have documented that such SuDS
are not being delivered consistently and sufficiently. Fur-
thermore, when they are delivered, there is little expertise
or resources in LAs to assess whether they are being con-
structed and maintained properly. As this paper has
shown, inquiring into the broader governance processes is
one of the most prescient tasks, as it has major institutional
and practical implications for the implementation of SuDS.
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ENDNOTES
1 NB. It is not clear from the review to what extent the applications
with permeable paving overlap with the applications with attenu-
ation ponds/swales.
2 To note that the FWMA 2010 applies to both England and Wales.
Law and powers in relation to flood risk management are largely
devolved in Wales to the Welsh Ministers. Wales has different
government departments and agencies, setting and implementing
policy independently from the national (United Kingdom) level.
The Welsh Government proceeded with the implementation of
Schedule 3, making sustainable drainage systems on new develop-
ments mandatory and to be built in accordance with Statutory
SuDS Standards from January 7, 2019 (see: https://gweddill.gov.
wales/topics/environmentcountryside/epq/flooding/drainage/?
lang=en).
3 Particularly relevant to paragraphs 79–85 of the Planning Practice
Guidance—available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/flood-risk-
and-coastal-change#planning-and-flood-risk
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